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Abstract 
The answers people give when asked to “think of the 
unexpected” for everyday event scenarios appear to be more 
expected than unexpected. There are expected unexpected 
outcomes that closely adhere to the given information in a 
scenario, based on familiar disruptions and common plan-
failures. There are also unexpected unexpected outcomes that 
are more inventive, that depart from given information, adding 
new concepts/actions. However, people seem to tend to  
conceive of the unexpected as the former more than the latter. 
Study 1 tests these proposals by analysing the object-concepts 
people mention in their reports of the unexpected and the 
agreement between their answers. Study 2 shows that object-
choices are weakly influenced by recency, that is, the order of 
sentences in the scenario. The implications of these results for 
ideas in philosophy, psychology and computing are discussed.  
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 As we know, there are known knowns; there are things that 
we know that we know. We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we 
do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones 
we don't know we don't know. 
Donald Rumsfeld, Feb 2002, US Secretary of Defence 
1. Introduction 
In an uncertain and contingent world, our ability to deal with 
the unexpected often gives us safe passage through the Siren-
like obstacles of everyday life (see e.g., Weiner, 1985a).  The 
Cognitive Sciences have often concerned themselves with 
how people think about the unexpected.  However, most of 
this research relies on theory-driven definitions of the 
unexpected (e.g., low probability events), rather than simply 
asking people to “think of the unexpected” and see how they 
respond1.  In the present paper, we report two studies that ask 
people to generate unexpected events for everyday scenarios 
and then analyse their responses.  As the title of the paper 
suggests, our main finding is that people’s conception of the 
unexpected is not really that unexpected at all. 
In Cognitive Psychology, unexpectedness is often used as 
a dependent variable in studies of human thinking and 
decision making. For example, in reasoning research, the 
unexpected has often been proposed to elicit counterfactual 
thinking (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; McEleney & Byrne, 
                                                        
1 Khemlani et al.’s (2011) Expt. 3 is a notable, but rare, exception 
though it focusses on the issue of latent scope. 
2006).  In attribution research, the unexpected has been cast 
as non-normative behavior in others, that elicits spontaneous 
causal thinking (Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985b). And, 
surprising events are often defined in terms of their 
unexpectedness (Meyer et al., 1997; Maguire et al., 2011).  
However, most of these studies do not actually ask people 
to report unexpected outcomes; rather they adopt a priori 
operational definitions of unexpectedness based on the 
experimenter’s theoretical stance.  The unexpected is 
commonly operationalized as (i) an event rated as having a 
low subjective probability (Maguire et al., 2011; Teigen & 
Keren, 2003), or (ii) profiles of people with inconsistent traits 
(Hastie, 1984), or (iii) events that are simply asserted to be 
unexpected to the actors in a narrative (McEleney & Byrne, 
2006). In contrast, we do not use a priori definitions but 
rather, simply, ask people to tell us what they consider the 
unexpected to be. This sort of behaviour was observed by 
Foster & Keane (2015, 2019), in studies on surprise, in the 
form of familiar surprises (“I am surprised my wallet is 
missing from my trouser pocket, but I am guessing it was 
robbed”) and unfamiliar surprises ( “I am surprise my belt is 
missing from my trousers but have no idea how that could 
have happened”; see also Maguire & Keane, 2006). 
1.1 Thinking About the Unexpected 
Consider the simple task used in the current experiments to 
elicit unexpected events from people.   Imagine being told a 
story about a woman, called Louise, who is going shopping 
at her favourite clothes store, in which she draws money from 
an ATM and heads into town on the bus.  Now imagine you 
are told “Something unexpected occurred. What do you think 
happened?”   One could respond with one of the following 
unexpected events, saying that: 
1) Louise lost the money she drew from the ATM. 
2) Louise was delayed in traffic, arrived late and the 
shop was shut. 
However, one could also validly say: 
3) The bus stopped at a charity bus-wash and Louise got 
covered in suds. 
4) Louise pulled a gun on the driver and robbed him to 
raise more money for her shopping spree. 
Intuitively, as unexpected outcomes, the first two answers (1-
2) are quite conservative and mundane and less unexpected 
than the latter two responses (3-4) which are more inventive 
and a lot more unexpected.   We call the former answers the 
expected unexpected and gloss the latter as the unexpected 
unexpected.   
Expected unexpected outcomes tend to maintain the 
original goal of the story scenario (i.e., shopping) and the 
stated object-concepts associated with the story’s goal; these 
goal concepts tend to be re-used in the unexpected event (i.e., 
bus, ATM, money, store) and few new objects are added (e.g., 
traffic).  Furthermore, these events are often “common 
failures” that are familiar to people; losing one’s money or 
being delayed are common reasons for failed plans and goals.  
     Unexpected unexpected outcomes, in contrast, may 
establish new goals for the story scenario (e.g., attending a 
charity event) and, though goal objects may be used (i.e., bus, 
money), often “new” object-concepts not present in the 
original story are introduced (e.g., guns, suds).  Also, these 
unexpected events are quite unfamiliar to the scenario: 
getting involved in a charity bus-wash is not a common 
everyday event for most people who are going shopping.  In 
previous work on surprise using these everyday scenarios 
(Foster & Keane, 2015), we noticed that people typically 
produced expected unexpected answers rather than 
unexpected unexpected ones.  But, why?  
     Why do people minimally perturb the stated scenario, 
keeping its goals and goal-concepts in these expected-
unexpected events that they seem to prefer to generate?  One 
possibility is that when people are thinking about the 
unexpected, they are essentially trying to explain how current 
goals might fail; so, unexpected events tend to describe 
disruptions to a current plan or undoings of assumed facts that 
enable current goals. Being delayed in traffic disrupts 
Louise’s shopping plan, undoing the assumption that the bus 
gets her to the shop on time. Losing one’s money is an 
unexpected event that explains how any shopping-goal might 
fail. From an adaptive perspective, it makes sense to 
minimally change the current situation when projecting such 
unexpected futures. In contrast, more creative unexpected-
unexpected events, that depart significantly from the current 
scenario, may never occur and, therefore, seem not to be 
considered.   In short, the former probably have higher 
predictive value than the latter. Across the Cognitive 
Sciences, many researchers have highlighted this minimalist 
stance in people when they encounter the unexpected.   
1.2 The Minimalism of the Unexpected 
In Philosophy, when reasoning about inconsistencies (such as 
new, unexpected facts), it has been repeatedly proposed that 
any change to stated propositions or prior beliefs should be 
as minimal as possible; observing the “maxim of minimal 
mutilation” (Quine, 1992, p.14), or the “principle of 
conservativism” (Harman, 1986, p.46).  Similarly, in 
considering counterfactual situations (of which unexpected 
situations could be a subclass), Lewis (1986), taking a 
possible-world perspective, talks of finding the maximally-
similar world to the current one.   
                                                        
2 Note, both Leake and Schank maintain that not all situations can 
be handled by these pre-canned explanation-patterns; explaining the 
    In Psychology, related ideas arise in considering the 
minimal-mutability of counterfactual scenarios (Kahneman 
& Miller, 1986).  Also, in the psychology of explanation, 
several researchers have noted how explanations of the 
unexpected maintain aspects of the original scenario; they 
preserve the level-of-abstraction of the original scenario 
rather than identifying new or more specific information (see 
e.g., Johnson & Keil, 2014) or they favor explanations with a 
narrow, latent scope (Khemlani et al., 2011).   
    In Artificial Intelligence, theories of understanding and 
explanation directly predict minimalism and show how the 
“expected unexpected” might arise (see Leake, 1991, 1992; 
Schank, 1986; Schank, Kass & Riesbeck, 1994).  David 
Leake’s (1992) computational account of understanding 
gives the most comprehensive account of what people might 
be doing when asked to “think of the unexpected” (see also 
Schank, 1986).  Leake argues that people store explanation 
patterns to handle plan failures and anomalies encountered in 
everyday life.  These explanation patterns can be thought of 
as “script-like” structures (Schank & Abelson, 1977), at 
varying degrees of abstraction, that can account for 
difficulties that arise in plans; for instance, in considering 
how a planned shopping-expedition might be disrupted, a 
number of standard disruption-events suggest themselves 
from pre-stored explanation patterns (e.g., that I might be 
mugged, or that I might lose my money or that I might be 
delayed).  To handle a contingent world, it is proposed that 
we store these pre-canned explanations and retrieve them to 
quickly explain unexpected happenings2.  Although these 
ideas have been referenced in the psychological literature 
(e.g., Hastie, 1984), they have not been worked up into a 
psychological model or specifically tested.  Here, we propose 
an initial psychological account, that we then test this model 
in two experiments. 
1.3 Minimal Retrieval Model 
Our psychological account for the generating unexpected 
events is called the Minimal Retrieval Model (MRM). 
According to this model, when people are asked for 
unexpected outcomes to everyday scenarios, they retrieve 
explanation patterns and adapt them to the situation in hand.  
Specifically, that people build a cue frame using the given 
information in the scenario (e.g., the goals, actors, actions and 
objects mentioned) to search memory for suitable 
explanation patterns.  For example, when people are told 
Louise had the goal of going shopping, took money from the 
ATM and then went to town, it is assumed that memory is 
searched for explanation patterns involving shopping-goals, 
female-shoppers, buses, money, and ATMs. Accordingly, 
unexpected events such as Louise losing her money, having 
problems with the ATM, or being delayed will tend to be 
found in memory and returned as responses, rather than more 
inventive answers.   
     Minimal Retrieval Model makes several predictions about 
the nature of the unexpected outcomes reported by people; 
specifically, it is predicted that (i) reported unexpected events 
should tend to use the stated object-concepts in the original 
unexpected may sometimes involve much more creative uses of 
prior knowledge, such as analogical explanations. 
scenario because memory will be cued with these concepts 
and the retrieved explanation patterns will instantiate these 
objects, (ii) goal-related objects will be preferred in reported 
events, over non-goal objects, (iii) people will tend to agree 
on the reported unexpected events because they are using 
familiar plan-failures (i.e., explanation patterns).   Note, the 
first two of these predictions basically propose that 
minimalism is a side-effect of the retrieval process and the 
third prediction basically says that answers will be expected-
unexpected events rather than unexpected-unexpected ones. 
Table 1: Louise-Shopping Story & Answer Categories                               
 
Sentence Order Used in Study 1 & 2 (Normal Condition) 
Goal         (S1) Louise wants to shop at an expensive 
clothes store. 
Non-Goal (S2) She is wearing her favourite dress and 
matching shoes. 
Goal Step  (S3) Louise draws money from the ATM. 
 
Sentence Order Used in Study 2 (Reversed Condition) 
Goal         (S1) Louise wants to shop at an expensive 
clothes store. 
Goal Step  (S2) Louise draws money from the ATM. 
Non-Goal  (S3) She is wearing her favourite dress and 
matching shoes. 
 
Answer Categories for Unexpected Events 
ls_neg_ans1 She has insufficient money to buy 
ls_neg_ans2 She has problems with the ATM 
ls_neg_ans3 She is robbed or loses money/card/id. 
ls_neg_ans4 Clothes issues (dress rips, shoe snaps). 
ls_neg_ans5 The shop is closed. 
ls_pos_ans1 She finds or ATM gives more money. 
ls_pos_ans2 She has more money than she thought. 
ls_pos_ans3 Good events involving shoes and dress. 
ls_pos_ans4 Sale is on at the shop. 
ls_other e.g.; ATM speaks,gives money to charity. 
Preference for Stated Object-Concepts. If memory is being 
searched with the stated goals and object-concepts given in 
the scenario then the explanation patterns retrieved should 
reflect these objects/entities and minimally introduce new 
objects (e.g., ones that mention money, ATMs, buses).   This 
process thus delivers unexpected events that remain close to 
the original scenario, with perhaps better predictive value.  In 
Quine’s terms, the reported unexpected event will minimally 
mutilate the original scenario.  In the present studies, we 
measure this minimalism by recording the frequency of stated 
objects versus new objects in the reported unexpected 
                                                        
3 Though, obviously, it could be made goal-critical with additional 
conditions (e.g., if one said “she wanted to be able to match the 
clothes she was wearing with those in the shop”). 
outcomes (excluding references to Louise who as the main 
actor will always tend to be mentioned).  
Preference for Goal Objects. Within the preference for 
stated objects, MRM also predicts that goal-related objects 
will be preferred over less goal-related objects (which we will 
call non-goal objects).   For example, if the scenario mentions 
that “Louise was wearing her favorite dress and matching 
shoes” (see Table 1), these objects dress and shoes are less 
goal-critical.   People need money to go shopping but what 
they wear is less critical to the shopping goal 3.  Although, it 
is feasible to generate unexpected events from these non-goal 
objects (e.g., “when Louise got on the bus, everyone was 
wearing the same dress and shoes”), explanation patterns 
based on non-goal objects are less likely to be retrieved 
because they are not goal-critical.  In the present studies, we 
check for this preference by recording the frequency of stated 
goals-objects versus non-goal objects in the reported 
unexpected outcomes (obviously, again, excluding 
references to Louise who as the main actor will tend to be 
mentioned anyway). 
Agreement. By definition, explanation patterns are 
explanations for commonly-occurring disruptions to 
everyday plan-goal sequences; it makes more sense for the 
cognitive system to assume that disruptions that happened 
repeatedly in the past will happen again.  As such, they should 
be familiar to people, they should be expected-unexpected 
events.  Hence, there should be a high level of agreement 
between people in the unexpected outcomes they propose. 
This means that most answers should fall into a small set of 
common answer-categories; for instance, we should see 
many people using answers that describe “Louise losing her 
money” or “the shop being shut” (see Table 1).  In the present 
studies, we test this prediction by classifying people’s 
responses into answer-categories and recording the 
proportion of answers that fall into these categories.  In the 
remainder of this paper, we report two experiments designed 
to test these predictions. To the best of our knowledge, these 
tests are new, as are the measures used to assess what people 
report as the unexpected.  
2. Study 1: How Unexpected? 
The study presented participants with scenarios describing 
everyday events such as going shopping, doing exams, going 
on trips and attending business meetings (adapted from 
Foster & Keane, 2015). Each story was followed by an 
instruction to think of the unexpected.  The unexpected 
outcomes reported for each scenario were categorized by 
three judges in terms of object-concepts (i.e., goal-objects, 
non-goal-objects, both goal- and non-goal-objects and 
neither of the stated objects) and answer-categories used. 
Fig 1. Frequencies for Answer Categories in Louise Story (see Table 1 for Meaning of Answer Code)
2.1 Method 
Participants & Design.  The study involved 127 participants 
and was run on the crowdsourcing platform, prolific.com4.  
Participants were native English speakers from 
Ireland/UK/USA and had not participated in previous studies 
by the group.   
Procedure & Materials.  All participants received the same 
20 scenarios (randomly re-ordered for each participant), after 
first being shown two practice materials (these items were not 
flagged as practice items and not included in the analysis).   
Participants were presented with a series of web pages, 
explaining the task and then presented with one scenario after 
the other, each on its own page. Each material was presented 
along with the associated instruction to think of unexpected 
outcomes to the scenario (material lists available on request). 
      Each scenario was described in three sentences: a setting 
goal-sentence (S1; Louise going shopping), one giving 
additional information that was not on the critical path of the 
plan for the goal (S2; Louise wearing her favourite dress and 
shoes) and a final one describing some further action taken to 
achieve the goal (S3: Louise drawing money, see Table 1).  
Two comprehension questions were asked about the scenario, 
as a test micro-task, to ensure participants had carefully read 
and understood the scenario.  The instruction to think of the 
unexpected followed these questions.  Participants wrote 
their responses in a text-field with no upper limit.  
Measures & Judgements.  In total the study yielded 2,540 
responses (127 participants x 20 materials) each of which 
were judged by three raters (i.e., the three authors) for 
answer-type and the use of goal-related and non-goal-related  
objects (the main actor of the scenario was always excluded 
from this object judgement).  Every response was categorized 
into answer categories specific to the material (e.g., in Louise 
scenario, answers about losing money, being delayed, the 
                                                        
4 The original experiment was divided into four conditions that used 
variants on the main instruction: asking for “something 
unexpected”, “something good and unexpected”, “something bad 
shop being shut).  The classification of answers by the three 
judges revealed high levels of agreement: pairwise 
comparisons between judgements revealed Cohen’s Kappas 
from K=0.82 to K=0.89. The classification of objects in the 
answers (as goal, non-goal, both, neither stated object) by the 
three judges had lower, but acceptable, levels of agreement. 
Agreement between Judge-1 and Judge-3 was lower 
(K=0.56) as object classifications were re-defined more 
tightly for Judge-2 and 3, who agreed more often (K=0.74). 
The final classifications chosen for all judgements was based 
on a majority vote from the three judges. Three-way splits 
(which were rare, N<20) were resolved by discussion. 
2.2 Results & Discussion 
Overall, the results confirm the predictions made from the 
Minimal Retrieval Model; the unexpected is really not that 
unexpected.  People tend to (i) stick to the stated objects in 
the scenario rather than  use new objects, (ii) they show a 
strong preference for given goal-objects over non-goal 
objects, (iii) they agree on the unexpected events reported, as 
a few answer-categories cover most responses made.    
Preference for Stated Objects. As predicted, people tend to 
stick to the object-concepts given in the scenario (e.g., the 
money, buses, shoes of the Louise story), rather than 
introducing new objects into their answers.  Of the 2,540 
unexpected outcomes reported by participants, 78% 
(N=1891) relied on the given objects, while only 22% 
(N = 649) of answers mentioned none of the stated objects 
(i.e., “Louise met her best friend”).  Most unexpected 
outcomes assert a new relation between the given objects 
(e.g., “The ATM showed Louise had more money”).    
Preference for Goal over Non-Goal Objects. Furthermore, 
of the 78% (N=1,891) of unexpected outcomes that used the 
given objects from the scenario, the majority used only goal-
objects (80%; N=1,518) with a minority using the non-goal 
and unexpected”, or “what would happen if the goal failed”.  For 
brevity, this manipulation is not reported here, as the same pattern 
of responding is seen across all these four conditions. 
objects (14%; N=261) and a few using both stated object-
types (6%; N=112). Chi2 tests performed on frequencies of 
the four object-types (df=3) for each material were all 
statistically significant at p < 0.01. Also, a by-materials 
analysis, using Wilcoxen’s test, revealed a statistically 
significant difference in the proportions of goal versus non-
goal objects chosen, z = 3.00, p < .001. 
     Of course, one could argue that this result is not surprising, 
as two sentences mentioned goal-objects (S1 and S3) and 
only one mentions non-goal objects (S2, see e.g. Table 1)5. 
However, even if examine goal and non-goal object choices 
at the sentence level, the preference for goal-objects remains: 
on average, goal-objects are chosen from S1 (M=27%) and 
S3 (M=44%) more often than the non-goal-objects from S2 
(M=13%; see Table 2).  Chi2 tests performed on 40 pairwise 
comparisons of choices, for S1xS2 and S2xS3, found that 
only 5 comparisons were non-significant (most are p <  .001).   
However, it is clear that there is a preference for goal-objects 
from the final sentence in the scenario (S3 at 44%), 
suggesting a recency effect, that we explore in Study 2.  
    Thus far, the evidence suggests that people respond in a 
minimalist way, sticking close to the original scenario’s 
objects, with a strong preference for stated goal-related 
objects over stated non-goal objects. 
Agreement in Answer Categories. Apart from analysing the 
object-concepts used in the unexpected outcome, we also 
categorised responses and noted their frequency of 
occurrence (e.g. see Table 2 and Fig.1). On average, materials 
were found to involve 10 answer categories (M=10.68, 
SD=1.7); Min=6 (lucy_loan) and a Max=13 (robert_essay; 
see Table 2).  Figure 1 shows a typical distribution of 
responses across answer-categories for the Louise story; note, 
the top-3 most-frequently-used answer-categories of 10 
categories tend to cover most responses (63%) followed by a 
long tail of lower-frequencies for other categories.   Note, one 
answer-category was used as a residual one (the other 
category), and it typically also has a low count.   
     Table 2 shows the percentage of responses that fall into 
the top-3 most-used answer-categories for each material. In 
the most extreme case, lucy_loan, 89% of responses are 
covered by the top-3 answer-categories, with the lowest being 
49% (for bill_holiday).  This pattern of responding shows that 
there are very high levels of agreement between people with 
respect to the unexpected events they propose. For example, 
in the louise_shopping scenario, 29% of people proposed that 
Louise had money problems such as spending too much or 
not having enough money for the clothes (ls_neg_ans1), 25% 
proposed that she lost her money in some way (ls_neg_ans3) 
and 9% said that the ATM told her she had more money than 
she thought (ls_pos_ans2).  None of these unexpected events 
are particularly “unexpected”; they are rather, typical 
disruptions that occur in everyday plans to achieve mundane 
                                                        
5 Also, note the sentences themselves in the original scenarios 
mentioned equivalent numbers of objects (by-materials, paired t-
tests on the object counts in S1, S2 and S3 revealed no differences, 
all ps > 0.10).   
6 The original experiment had 6 conditions that used (i) the three 
instructional variants used in Study 1 (“unexpected”, “good and 
goals. They are expected unexpected events. Indeed, more 
inventive answers -- the unexpected unexpected -- are quite 
rare and typically found in the other category. For instance, 
in the Louise story, the other category (ls_other, N=8) 
includes responses about (i) Louise deciding to give her 
money to a charity instead, (ii) Louise being approached by a 
film director who says she is beautiful and wants to make her 
a star and, (iii) the wonderful “The ATM opens, and Louise 
realizes it is a portal to her happiest childhood memory”.   
These sorts of answers are the unexpected unexpected, truly 
unusual possible outcomes but, notably, are rare too. 
3.  Study 2: The Recently Unexpected? 
Study 1 supports the minimalist predictions that people will 
stick closely to the original scenario, introduce few “new” 
objects and agree with others when proposing unexpected 
events for everyday scenarios. However, with respect to the 
object-concept analyses, the preference for goal-objects 
(especially, objects from the final sentence, S3) and lack-of-
preference for non-goal objects could be due, in part, to a 
recency effect.  That is, maybe people follow on from the last 
sentence in the story and, hence, use its goal-objects.  For 
example, in the Louise story people do not mention her shoes 
and dress (the non-goal objects from S2) but rather follow on 
from the mention of ATMs and money (from S3) in proposing 
their unexpected outcome.  If this were true then people’s 
object-choices perhaps hinge less on their goal or non-goal 
status but more on order of mention.  In this study, we put the 
non-goal sentence last (S3) to check if this changes the 
object-choices made (see Table 1 for a sample material).  
3.1 Method 
Participants and Design.  The study involved 258 
participants on the prolific.com crowdsourcing platform5,6.  
All were native English speakers from Ireland/UK/USA and 
had not taken part in our previous studies.   
Procedure & Materials.  All participants received the 20 
scenarios used in Study 1, using the same procedure.  There 
were two main conditions of interest: Normal (N = 126) and 
Reversed conditions (N = 132).  Participants in the Normal 
condition received the same materials as those used in 
Study 1. Participants in the Reversed condition received 
variants of these materials, in which the non-goal sentence 
was moved to the last position in the story (S3; see example 
in Table 1).   
Measures & Judgements.  In total the study yielded 5,160 
responses (258 participants x 20 materials).  Given the very 
large number of responses in this experiment, we automated 
the object-judgement process  (program and data will be 
made available on email request). A program, called 
ObjJudge was developed using the NLTK, Pandas and SciPy 
python packages to process the answers and identify whether 
unexpected”, “bad and unexpected”), crossed with (ii) a variant to 
think of “bizarre” events.  Initial, analyses suggested that these 
variables do not impact the pattern of responding for object choices 
and, for brevity, are not reported here. 
they mentioned goal-objects, non-goal-objects, both object-
types or neither.  The program was trained on responses and 
their respective judgments from Study 1.  Using lists of the 
object-entities (i.e.; object words given in the scenarios and 
synonyms provided in responses from Study 1), ObjJudge 
sorts the responses given in Study 2 into goal-object, non-
goal object, both, or neither categories. 
Stated simply, this program matches object-entities in the 
response-string against object-lists for each material 
(including common synonyms that people used in Study 1 
answers).   With this program, we achieved a high accuracy 
over all materials comparing its object-judgements against 
the human-judgments from Study 1 (M=93%; Min=90%, 
Max = 97%; Cohen’s Kappa was K=1).  In all other respects, 
the object-judgement measures were as detailed in Study 1. 
3.2 Results & Discussion 
The results replicate the findings of Study 1 that people (i) 
stick to the stated objects in the scenario rather than using 
new objects, (ii) they show a strong preference for the given 
goal-objects over non-goal objects.  However, it also shows 
that here is a slight recency effect, in the Reversed condition, 
where the choice of non-goal objects increased by about 9% 
relative to the Normal condition. 
Preference for Stated Objects. As we saw in Study 1, 
people tend to stick to the object-concepts given in the 
scenario (e.g., the money, shoes of the Louise story), rather 
than introducing new objects into their answers (e.g., guns, 
suds). Of the 5,160 unexpected outcomes reported by 
participants, 79% (N=4,098) made use of objects stated in the 
scenario, while only 21% (N = 1,062) of answers mentioned 
none of the given objects  Most of the unexpected outcomes 
reported created a new relation between the given objects 
(e.g., “The ATM showed Louise had more money”).    
Preference for Goal over Non-Goal Objects. In a similar 
vein, of the 4,098 (79% of 5,160) unexpected outcomes that 
used objects from the original scenario, the majority 
mentioned only goal-objects (56%; N=2,869) whereas a 
minority mentioned only non-goal objects (13%; N=688), 
with some responses mentioning both goal and non-goal 
objects (10%; N=541).  Chi2 tests performed on frequencies 
of object-types reported for each material were all significant 
at p < 0.05 (df=3, with corrections for low-valued cells).  
     However, these analyses collapse across the Normal-
Reversed manipulation designed to test for recency.    When 
these conditions are broken out there is a small but 
statistically-significant increase in the use of the non-goal 
objects (roughly 9%, with a corresponding reduction in goal-
object choices).  The following are the relative percentages, 
for each choice category, Chi2(3) = 76.9, p < 0.001: 
Cond. Goal Non-Goal Both Neither 
Normal 61% 10% 9% 20% 
Reversed 51% 16% 12% 21% 
In short, when the sentence with the non-goal objects is last 
in the story, people prefer to use the non-goal objects 
somewhat more often; showing that they are sensitive, to 
some degree, to the order in which  information is given, 
though the dominance of goal-object choice still remains. 
4. Conclusions   
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the only 
one simply asking people to “think of the unexpected” when 
presented with everyday scenarios.    Our view is that when 
people are asked to do this, they tend to recall characteristic 
explanation patterns that account for common disruptions to 
everyday plans and goals (e.g., losing a resource, being 
delayed in executing a plan step).  Accordingly, people report 
unexpected events are not really that unexpected; the 
expected unexpected.  This work shows that these are a class 
of unexpected events --  things that commonly go wrong –	that	are to be distinguished from “truly unexpected” events 
(as Foster & Keane, 2015, found for surprising events). These 
findings should prompt a re-assessment of what we mean by 
the “unexpected” as a dependent variable in exploring aspects 
of human thought. It also raises the interesting prospect, that 
there is a lot more to be discovered about what people 
conceive the unexpected to be.   
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Table 2: Percentages of  Responses Made for Various Measures, by Material, in Study 1  (N=127 responses per material) 
 
Material 
% Top-3 
Answer 
Cats. 
No. of 
Answer 
Cats. 
% Goal 
Obj. 
 
% Non-
Goal 
Obj. 
% Both 
Obj. 
% 
Neither
Obj. 
 
% S1 
Goal 
Objs 
% S2 
Non-Goal 
Objs 
% S3 
Goal 
Objs 
alan_plane 55% 12 64% 7% 6% 24% 38% 11% 29% 
anna_interview 74% 10 71% 6% 9% 15% 33% 12% 43% 
belinda_meeting 58% 11 37% 28% 20% 15% 21% 32% 37% 
bill_holiday 49% 12 48% 9% 2% 40% 23% 19% 58% 
bob_job 81% 8 78% 0% 0% 22% 19% 0% 63% 
edith_exam 50% 11 44% 20% 11% 25% 31% 20% 33% 
john_party 67% 12 62% 1% 0% 37% 34% 1% 34% 
karen_bus 57% 10 81% 2% 0% 17% 31% 1% 54% 
mary_food 69% 8 80% 6% 2% 13% 64% 1% 29% 
katie_kitten 50% 11 91% 1% 7% 1% 16% 11% 66% 
louise_shopping 63% 10 64% 7% 6% 24% 21% 2% 68% 
lucy_loan 89% 6 87% 0% 2% 11% 3% 7% 77% 
michael_tea 56% 12 34% 35% 6% 24% 9% 38% 30% 
peter_college 56% 12 59% 2% 1% 38% 37% 3% 27% 
rebecca_swimming 54% 12 46% 6% 6% 43% 36% 8% 25% 
robert_essay 54% 13 27% 41% 9% 23% 18% 38% 27% 
sally_wine 54% 12 62% 9% 8% 21% 35% 13% 36% 
sean_call 65% 10 61% 10% 6% 24% 31% 9% 44% 
sam_driving 61% 11 64% 5% 9% 23% 31% 14% 35% 
steve_gardening 55% 11 59% 9% 13% 18% 8% 20% 63% 
 
